This paper uses a sample of 335 firms participating in strategic alliances in order to re-examine the value creation through strategic alliances. We show that the immediate positive response of stock markets to new strategic alliances is followed by negative abnormal returns. Twenty days after announcements, cumulative positive abnormal return is only evident for the firms with the highest stock market's response to the announcement. We relate the positive abnormal returns reported in previous research to the presence of short-run over-reaction in stock markets and conclude in the market's ability to identify the more valuable alliances.
Introduction
Compared to other types of cooperation between firms, strategic alliances seem to be less demanding. Alliances are often created without any exchange of shares or capital investment. Firms agree to share knowledge, or to cooperate in development, production or marketing of products with a low level of commitment. The lack of commitment may reduce different type of risk. Firms suspecting that cooperation might not be successful, can use this type of cooperation in order to test the potential of the cooperation without risking control over their unique knowledge, product or market stance. If the firms involved in the alliance are themselves skeptical, why shouldn't the investors be skeptical too? If strategic alliances create value, why wouldn't firms engage in artificial alliances simply in order to deceive the market and elevate their value?
Many studies have tried to test value creation through strategic alliances that do not involve exchange of shares or capital investment. Chan et al. (1997) used event study methodology to examine stock price responses to non-equity alliance announcements. However the cumulative abnormal return in these studies was calculated up to five to six days after the announcement, and no test was carried out to examine the persistence of the created value beyond the announcement period.
Over-reaction and under-reaction of stock markets is prevalent. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) were among the first to document long-term (three to five years) reversal in stock returns; winner firms tend to be future losers, and vice versa. They attributed this phenomenon of over-reaction to the behavioral decision theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) . The poor post-event returns of initial public offerings documented by Ritter (1991) , and later on by others, can also be treated as an over-reaction phenomenon.
On the other hand, it seems that markets also tend to under-react. Ball and Brown (1968) were the first to show that stock prices respond to earnings about a year after they are announced. Short-term momentum in stock returns was first identified by Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) that showed winners are to be future short-term winners and losers to be short-term losers. This phenomenon can also be classified as a symptom of under-reaction.
These phenomena of over-reaction and under-reaction can blur the real value of events in the context of event-study methodology. In this study we carry out an eventstudy similar to those of previous studies (such as Chan et al. (1997) and Woolridge and Snow (1990)) and simply refine it by prolonging the post-event window to 20 days after the announcement day. Hence, we are able to control for possible shortterm anomalies (over-reaction and under-reaction).
The sample used is of 335 firms (including 66 duplicates) traded in the US and participating in 289 strategic alliances throughout the years 1990-1997. As in previous studies, a market model is used for measuring abnormal returns. Characteristics of firms are collected from public announcements and the COMPUTAT database. Daily returns are taken from CRSP.
The estimation reveals that, as in previous studies, participating firms exhibit positive and statistically significant abnormal returns during the 3-day period surrounding the announcement day. The abnormal returns are also higher for alliances involving capital investments. Focusing on alliances that do not involve capital investments, we report several interesting results. Over-reaction dominates the short-run results.
Positive abnormal returns are followed by statistically significant and negative abnormal return on a scale such that the cumulative abnormal return up to 20 days after the announcement is non-positive and statistically insignificant. Focusing on firms without negative pre-event abnormal returns reveals that the observed reversal in returns is not due to momentum effect.
Though on average strategic alliances do not create value, one cannot reject the possibility that some alliances do. The positive abnormal return of firms with the highest positive immediate response persists at least 20 days after the announcement day. We relate this finding to the market's ability to identify the more valuable alliances.
Several tests are carried out in order to identify the characteristics of firms and alliances with positive abnormal returns. Out of these characteristics, high-tech firms, small firms and firms in alliances aiming at the current markets of the participants, exhibit higher positive abnormal returns during the event window. While this is theoretically expected and was also observed in previous studies, we also show that these positive abnormal returns might also be a product of over-reaction. We conclude that additional characteristics are used by market players in assessing the value added of strategic alliances.
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 summarizes related literature and presents the research hypotheses. A description of the database and the methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
Related Literature and Research Hypotheses
Earlier studies acknowledge a positive and significant average return surrounding the announcement date of the alliance. The type of the alliance is an example of such an alliance characteristic. Promotional alliances are one type of alliance. Such an alliance is basically an advertising and promotion contract combined with a long-run relationship. The main benefit of a promotional alliance is that it increases consumer awareness about the firm's products and services.
A technological alliance is another type of alliance and it appeared to be of a greater value. Liu (2004) examined the stock market reactions to U.S biotech innovation news announcements from 1983 to 1993. He found positive abnormal returns during the announcement period. He also found post-announcement abnormal returns that were positively related to a firm's technology depth. examined 119 strategic alliances formed from 1987 to 1991. They found that the capital markets appear to be indifferent to announcements of strategic alliances. Nevertheless, having divided their sample by alliance type, they found that technological alliances enjoyed greater abnormal returns than marketing alliances. These findings were supported by Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) and by Chan et al. (1997) .
Another interesting finding is that the smaller partners in technological alliances appeared to benefit the most. Chung et al (2006) supported those findings. They proposed a framework to study the efficiency of alliances between small firms in the knowledge industry. They claimed that the benefits from forming an alliance are pronounced for small firms, as they specialize in a certain niche, which tends to be in demand regardless of the size of the partnering firms. Hoffman and Schlosser (2001) and Bar-Nir and Smith (2002) claimed that small firms creating alliances are provided with access to external resources and market opportunities. For large firms, the alliance with small firms provides the specialized expertise necessary to round off their capabilities and experience.
Parkhe (1993) dealt with national and multinational alliances. He compared alliances among US firms only to alliances involving a single US and a single non-US firm. He found fundamental differences between the two groups. His findings are explained by Kluckhohn and Kroeberg (1952), Beamish (1985) , Geringer and Hebert (1991) and Harrigan (1985) , claiming that multinational alliances bring together people who may have different patterns of behaving and believing. An example can be found in the partners' approaches to conflict resolution. In some cultures (e.g., Europe, US), conflict is viewed as a healthy and an inevitable part of relationships, while in other cultures (e.g., Japan, South Korea, the Middle East), conflict and open confrontation are deemed distasteful. Parkhe (1993) found that such fundamental differences create significant differences in the structuring and ongoing management of alliances. Such differences are not costless; hence, such international alliances are expected to be more volatile and less successful. The findings of Garrette and Dussauge (1995) support that assumption. They examined 63 international aerospace and defense industry alliances over the period . They found that the industry tends not to concentrate on an international level because of political constraints. Instead, they found that over the years, the industry has increasingly been moving towards establishing semi-structured organizations to manage multinational joint projects.
Thus, firms manage to gain a size advantage in global markets while maintaining autonomous decision-making centers at the country level.
Another interesting finding of Garrette and Dussauge (1995) deals with the goal of the alliance. Hennart (1988) and Kogut (1988) defined complementary (or link) alliances as those aiming to globalize a product in a multi-domestic setting by benefiting from the complementarities that exist between the partner firms. For instance, one partner promotes the other partner's products in a domestic market. Scale alliances are set up to deal with the increasing globalization of markets and customers. Therefore, they mutually develop, manufacture and market common products. The partners choose to unite in order to pool resources rather than to profit from any complementarities.
Another crucial issue deals with the stability and length of alliances. Williamson (1985) considered strategic alliances as "unstable, with a tendency to evolve into more stable organizational forms". Franko (1971) and (Kogut) 1988 claimed that many alliances characterized by a high degree of flexibility, a low level of irreversible commitment, and incomplete contracts are unsuitable for carrying out long-term projects. Therefore we would expect long-term alliances to be less stable, and hence less profitable and more likely to fail. 2000) reinforce this assumption. They offer a qualitative approach presenting the obstacles which may lead to termination of alliances. Though alliances depend on a great number of factors, the tension in short-term versus longterm orientation is a critical one. A long-term orientation provides the commitment needed for a good working relationship, whereas a short-term orientation stresses prompt results. They claim that in order to maintain an alliance, its partners need to be able to constantly maintain both long and short term orientations. Hamel (1991) claimed that asymmetry between the firms increases the probability of termination of the alliance. Therefore, we would expect long term alliances to have a greater probability of termination, since they need to maintain both long and short term orientations over time.
The following table summarizes the main empirical studies of the literature review.
Some studies examine stock market reaction to the alliance by using event study methodology; others examine the success of alliances by various measures: firm size, The main category data collected in Phase I is presented in Tables 1-8 . Table 1 shows the annual distribution of the strategic alliances within the sample and the firms participating in them. Of the 289 sample alliances, 33% were created in 1997 and 25% in 1996. In these alliances, 355 involved firms which had return data available in the CRSP database.
Since some firms have more than a single appearance in the database, the total sample consists of 298 firms only. The study considers duplicates as separate observations.
To distinguish alliances from other types of mutual agreements, it is customary to focus on alliances with no capital investment. Table 2 Since the statistical analysis is carried out on observations of alliances with no capital investment, the rest of the descriptive tables (Tables 3-8 ) presnt the characteristic distribution of observations for both alliance groups (with and without capital investment). Table 5 reveals that most of the firms participating in non capital alliances originate in the US (235 out of 293). 33 of the remaining firms are involved in multinational alliances and the rest (25 firms) may not be classified according to this principle. Table 6 indicates that both groups of marketing alliances, 'Market entry' and 'Existing market', are large enough to be the subject of separate analysis (98 firms and 169 firms respectively).
'Market entry' alliances are those aiming to enter a new market and 'Existing market' alliances are those aiming to enhance production or sale within partners' markets.
The classification of the firms in alliances without capital investment according to the longevity of the alliance (Table 7) reveals that most (213 out of 293 firms) chose to enter short-term alliances. However, almost half the firms in alliances with capital investment chose to enter into a long-term alliance. Short term alliance is indicated for announcements clarifying that the alliance is for a single product or project. Long term alliance is indicated for more than a single product or project or for firms signing long term agreements. Table 8 shows that majority of the sample firms are involved in alliances over a new product versus an existing product. This is true for alliances without capital investment (182 out of 293 firms deal with new products) while in alliances with capital investment the majority of the firms (34 out of 62) enter an alliance over an existing product.
These tables suggest that the alliances with capital investment have features signaling a higher prospect of success -high-tech firms in long-term alliances aiming to penetrate their current products into new markets.
Methodology
We conducted an event study to measure the stock markets' abnormal returns around the announcement of strategic alliances. The methods are similar to those described in Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997) . Defining the announcement day as day zero, the market model is estimated for each firm using daily stock returns and S&P 500 returns 
Results
In this section we report the results for the stock market response to announcements on strategic alliances. Overall, we find that stock markets react positively to market announcements during the announcement window but that stock prices fall to the level prior to the announcement within 20 days of the announcement. Table 9 Nevertheless, a special analysis is carried out to address the question of momentum. Table 10 shows the results of an event study carried out on four sub-samples. The re-examination of the size effect is shown in Table 13 . For this purpose, the sample is divided into two sub-samples based on the value of the total assets (retrieved from To address the relevance of the geographic location of the alliance parties (as documented by Parkhe, 1993), the sample is grouped again according to the location of all parties in the alliance (Table 14) . Alliances all of whose parties are incorporated in the US are called 'National' and those with at least one company located outside the US are called 'Multinational'. The results concerning this issue are mixed. While the AR of multinational alliances during the event window is higher, it is statistically insignificant.
The national alliances behave as the entire sample. A larger sample of multinational alliances would probably produce clearer results.
Alliances dealing with a current product are expected to have a higher probability of succeeding compared to alliances dealing with new products. Table 15 The issue of the stability of the alliances is tested and reported in Table 16 . As expected, short-tem alliances have a positive statistically significant response during the announcement window [-1,1] especially compared to the long-term alliances. Once again, the statistically significant market reversal during [5, 20] eliminates this AR and shortterm alliances do not appear to be more valuable.
To conclude, none of the characteristics documented in the literature predicting highervalue creation by strategic alliances appears to be economically and statistically significant when observing abnormal returns within 20 days after announcement days.
Summary and Conclusions
The current empirical literature testing value creation through strategic alliances, uses short-run event study methodology, and concludes with significant value creation by strategic alliances. Using a sample of 335 firms participating in 289 alliances over the years 1990-1997, we show that the positive value related to strategic alliances is due to over-reaction. We show that 20 days after announcing the alliance positive cumulative abnormal returns are only present in alliances that draw the highest market response at the announcement time interval. We also show that stocks of firms with several characteristics (such as high-tech, small size and participants in alliances focusing on current markets) exhibit a higher positive response to new alliances. However none of the tested characteristics is able to predict a positive abnormal return beyond the 20 days.
We conclude that the positive value of strategic alliances evident in previous research may simply be a product of mis-measurement of abnormal returns in the presence of short-run stock market anomalies. The only signal predicting persistent market response beyond the 20 days is the market's response itself at the time of announcement. Hence, we conclude that the stock market does identify the more valuable alliances. However, only long-run analysis of real achievements of strategic alliances, rather than observation of stock market response, may produce conclusive results in the evaluation of strategic alliances. Table 1 Annual distribution of strategic alliance announcements
This table shows the annual distribution of strategic alliance announcements and the number of firms involved in them throughout the period 1990-1997. Announcements were identified searching the Lexis/Nexis database using the key words "strategic alliance". Announcements in which neither firm has return data on CRSP available were omitted. Total Table 2 Firms' distribution by capital investment and by year
This table shows the annual distribution of firms in the sample by whether, according to the announcement, a type of capital investment (purchase of shares or direct investment) was involved in the announced alliance. Table 6 Firms' distribution by capital investment and by marketing goal (existing market/ market entry)
This Table 7 Firms' distribution by capital investment and by longevity of the alliance (short term/ long term)
This table shows the distribution of firms in the sample by the longevity goal of the alliance according to whether the alliance involved any type of capital investment. A short term alliance is indicated for announcements which make clear that the alliance is merely for a single product or project. A long term alliance is indicated for more than a single product or project, or for firms signing long term agreements. Table 9 Stock market reaction around announcement on strategic alliances
The following Table 10 Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances and momentum
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. The sample is by the abnormal return during the period 20 to 5 days before the announcement. Panel A shows the results for the group with the lowest abnormal return during days [-20, -5] , Panel D, the group with the highest.
[ Table 14 Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances -national vs. multinational alliances
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. Panel A shows the results for the group of firms in alliances where both firms are from the same country (national) and Panel B for the rest (multinational alliances).
[ Table 15 Stock market reaction to announcement on strategic alliances -current market vs. market entry
The following table shows the abnormal return of the stock prices around announcement on strategic alliances when there is no exchange of shares, nor any capital investment. Panel A is for the group of firms in alliances that deal with a current product of one of the companies (current market), and Panel B with firms in alliances dealing with entry to a new market by both companies (market entry).
[ 
